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Strongly Terminating Early-Stopping k-set Agreementin Synchronous Systemswith General Omission FailuresPhilippe Rapin Parvedy Michel Raynal Corentin TraversIRISA, Universite de Rennes 1, Campus de Beaulieu, 35042 Rennes Cedex, Francefpraipinp|raynal|ctraversg@irisa.frAbstractThe k-set agreement problem is a generalization of the consensus problem: considering asystem made up of n processes where each process proposes a value, each non-faulty process hasto decide a value such that a decided value is a proposed value, and no more than k dierentvalues are decided. It has recently be shown that, in the crash failure model, min(b fk c+2; b tk c+1)is a lower bound on the number of rounds for the non-faulty processes to decide (where t is anupper bound on the number of process crashes, and f , 0  f  t, the actual number of crashes).This paper considers the k-set agreement problem in synchronous systems where up tot < n=2 processes can experience general omission failures (i.e., a process can crash or omitsending or receiving messages). It rst introduces a new property, called strong termination.This property is on the processes that decide. It is satised if, not only every non-faultyprocess, but any process that neither crashes nor commits receive omission failure decides.Thepaper then presents a k-set agreement protocol that enjoys the following features. First, itis strongly terminating (to our knowledge, it is the rst agreement protocol to satisfy thisproperty, whatever the failure model considered). Then, it is early deciding and stopping in thesense that a process that either is non-faulty or commits only send omission failures decidesand halts by round min(b fk c + 2; b tk c + 1). To our knowledge, this is the rst early decidingk-set agreement protocol for the general omission failure model. Moreover, the protocol providesalso the following additional early stopping property: a process that commits receive omissionfailures (and does not crash) executes at most min(d fk e+2; b tk c+1) rounds. It is worth noticingthat the protocol allows each property (strong termination vs early deciding/stopping vs earlystopping) not to be obtained at the detriment of the two others.The combination of the fact that min(b fk c + 2; b tk c + 1) is lower bound on the number ofrounds in the crash failure model, and the very existence of the proposed protocol has two note-worthy consequences. First, it shows that, although the general omission failure model is moresevere than the crash failure model, both models have the same lower bound for the non-faultyprocesses to decide. Second, it shows that, in the general omission failure model, that boundapplies also the processes that do not crash and commit only send omission failures.Keywords: Agreement problem, Crash failure, Strong Termination, Early decision, Earlystopping, Eciency, k-set agreement, Message-passing system, Receive omission failure, Round-based computation, Send omission failure, Synchronous system.An extended abstract of a rst version (15 pages) of this paper has appeared in the proceedings of SIROCCO2006 [29]. 1
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1 IntroductionContext of the paper k-set and consensus problems. The k-set agreement problem generalizesthe uniform consensus problem (that corresponds to the case k = 1). It has been introduced byS. Chaudhuri who, considering the crash failure model, investigated how the number of choices (k)allowed to the processes is related to the maximum number (t) of processes that can be faulty (i.e.,that can crash) [7]. The problem can be dened as follows. Each of the n processes (processors)dening the system starts with its own value (called \proposed value"). Each process that does notcrash has to decide a value (termination), in such a way that a decided value is a proposed value(validity) and no more than k dierent values are decided (agreement)1.k-set agreement can trivially be solved in crash-prone asynchronous systems when k > t [7]. Aone communication step protocol is as follows: (1) t+ 1 processes are arbitrarily selected prior tothe execution; (2) each of these processes sends its value to all processes; (3) a process decides therst value it receives. Dierently, it has been shown that there is no solution in these systems assoon as k  t [5, 17, 32]. (The asynchronous consensus impossibility, case k = 1, was demonstratedbefore, using a dierent technique [11]. A combinatorial characterization of the tasks which aresolvable in presence of one process crash is presented in [3]). Several approaches have been pro-posed to circumvent the impossibility to solve the k-set agreement problem in process crash proneasynchronous systems (e.g., probabilistic protocols [22], or unreliable failure detectors with limitedscope accuracy [16, 21, 33]).The situation is dierent in process crash prone synchronous systems where the k-set agreementproblem can always be solved, whatever the value of t with respect to k. It has also been shownthat, in the worst case, the lower bound on the number of rounds (time complexity measured incommunication steps) is bt=kc + 1 [8]. (This bound generalizes the t + 1 lower bound associatedwith the consensus problem [1, 2, 10, 20]. See also [4] for the case t = 1.)Early decision. Although failures do occur, they are rare in practice. For the uniform consensusproblem (k = 1), this observation has motivated the design of early deciding synchronous protocols[6, 9, 19, 30], i.e., protocols that can cope with up to t process crashes, but decide in less than t+1rounds in favorable circumstances (i.e., when there are few failures). More precisely, these protocolsallow the processes to decide in min(f + 2; t + 1) rounds, where f is the number of processes thatcrash during a run, 0  f  t, which has been shown to be optimal (the worst scenario being whenthere is exactly one crash per round) [6, 18]2.In a very interesting way, it has very recently been shown that the early deciding lower boundfor the k-set agreement problem in the synchronous crash failure model is bf=kc+2 for 0  bf=kc bt=kc   2, and bf=kc+ 1 otherwise [12]. This lower bound, not only generalizes the correspondinguniform consensus lower bound, but also shows an \inescapable tradeo" among the number tof crashes tolerated, the number f of actual crashes, the degree k of coordination we want toachieve, and the best running time achievable [8]. As far as the time/coordination degree tradeois concerned, it is important to notice that, when compared to consensus, k-set agreement dividesthe running time by k (e.g., allowing two values to be decided halves the running time).1A process that decides and thereafter crashes is not allowed to decide one more value, in addition to the k allowedvalues. This is why k-set agreement generalizes uniform consensus where no two processes (be they faulty or not)can decide dierent values. Non-uniform consensus allows a faulty process to decide a value dierent from the valuedecided by the correct processes. The non-uniform version of the k-set agreement problem has not been investigatedin the literature.2More precisely, the lower bound is f + 2 when f  t  2, and f + 1 when f = t  1 or f = t.
2
Related work While not-early deciding k-set agreement protocols for the synchronous crashfailure model (i.e., protocols that always terminate in bt=kc + 1 rounds) are now well understood[2, 8, 20], to our knowledge, so far only two early deciding k-set agreement protocols have beenproposed [13, 27] for that model. The protocol described in [13] assumes t < n k, which means thatthe number of crashes t that can be tolerated decreases as the coordination degree k increases. Theprotocol described in [27], which imposes no constraint on t (i.e., t < n), is based on a mechanismthat allows the processes to take into account the actual pattern of crash failures and not onlytheir number, thereby allowing the processes to decide in much less than bf=kc+2 rounds in a lotof cases (the worst case being only when the crashes are evenly distributed in the rounds with kcrashes per round). We have recently designed an early deciding k-set agreement protocol for thesynchronous send (only) omission failure model [28]. A survey of the k-set agreement problem insynchronous systems prone to crash, send omission or general omission failures is presented in [31].Content of the paper This paper investigates the k-set agreement problem in synchronoussystems prone to general omission failures and presents a k-set protocol suited to this model.This failure model lies between the crash failure model and the Byzantine failure model [24]: afaulty process is a process that crashes, or omits sending or receiving messages [14, 25]. Thisfailure model is particularly interesting as it provides the system designers with a realistic way torepresent overow failures of the output buers (send omission failures) or input buers (receiveomission failures) of at most t processes [14, 25]. The proposed protocol enjoys several noteworthyproperties. The usual termination property used to dene an agreement problem concerns only the correctprocesses: they all have to decide. This requirement is tied to the problem, independently ofa particular model. Due to the very nature of the corresponding faults, there is no way toforce a faulty process to decide in the crash failure model. It is the same in the Byzantinefailure model where a faulty process that does not crash can decide an arbitrary value.The situation is dierent in the general omission failure model where a faulty process thatdoes not crash cannot have an arbitrary behavior. On one side, due to the very nature ofthe receive omission failures committed by a process, there are runs where that process canforever be prevented from learning that it can decide a value without violating the agreementproperty (at most k dierent values are decided)3. So, for such a process, the best that canbe done in the general case is either to decide a (correct) value, or halt without decidingbecause it does not know whether it has a value that can be decided. On the other side,a process that commits only send omission failures receives all the messages sent to it, andshould consequently be able to always decide a correct value.We say that a protocol is strongly terminating if it forces to decide all the processes thatneither crash nor commit receive omission failures(we call them the good processes; the otherprocesses are called bad processes). This new termination criterion is both theoreticallyand practically relevant: it extends the termination property to all the processes that arecommitting only \benign" faults. The proposed protocol is strongly terminating4. Although, as discussed before, early decision be an interesting property, some early-deciding(consensus) protocols make a dierence between early decision and early stopping: they allow3A process that commits receive omission failures, has an \autism" behavior. If it receives no message, it is isolatedfrom the other processes and cannot learn values from its environment.4None of the uniform consensus protocols for the synchronous general omission failure model that we are awareof (e.g., [25, 26]) is strongly terminating. 3
a correct process to decide in min(f +2; t+1) but stop only at a later round (e.g., [9]). Herewe are interested in early-deciding protocols in which a process decides and stops during thevery same round. More precisely, the proposed protocol has the following property:- A good process decides and halts by round min(bfk c+ 2; b tkc+ 1).So, when bfk c  b tkc   2, the protocol has the noteworthy property to extend the bfk c + 2lower bound for a correct process to decide (1) from the crash failure model to the generalomission failure model, and (2) from the correct processes to all the good processes.As noticed before, it is not possible to force a bad process to decide. So, for these processesthe protocol \does its best", namely it ensures the following early stopping property:- No process executes more than min(dfk e+ 2; b tk c+ 1) rounds.Let us notice that it is possible that a bad process decides just before halting. Moreover,when f = x k where x is an integer (which is always the case for consensus), or when thereis no fault (f = 0), a bad process executes no more rounds than a good process. In the othercases, it executes at most one additional round. Each message carries a proposed value and two boolean arrays of size n (sets of processidentities). This means that, if we do not consider the size of the proposed values (that doesnot depends on the protocol), the bit complexity is upper bounded by O(n2f=k) per process.The design of a protocol that satises, simultaneously and despite process crashes and generalomission faults, the agreement property of the k-set problem, strong termination, early decisionand stopping for the good processes and early stopping for the bad processes is not entirely obvious,as these properties are partly antagonistic. This is due to the fact that agreement requires that nomore than k distinct values be decided (be the deciding processes correct or not), strong terminationrequires that, in addition to the correct processes, a well dened class of faulty processes decide, andearly stopping requires the processes to halt as soon as possible. Consequently the protocol shouldnot prevent processes from deciding at dierent rounds, and so, after it has decided, a process canappear to the other processes as committing omission failures, while it is actually correct. Finally,the strong termination property prevents the elimination from the protocol of a faulty process thatcommits only send omission failures as soon as it has been discovered faulty, as that process has todecide a value if it does not crash later. A major diculty in the design of the protocol consists inobtaining simultaneously all these properties and not each one at the price of not satisfying one ofthe others.General transformations from a synchronous failure model to another synchronous failure model(e.g., from omission to crash) are presented in [23]. These transformations are general (they arenot associated with particular problems) and have a cost (simulating a round in the crash failuremodel requires two rounds in the more severe omission failure model). So, they are not relevantfor our purpose.When instantiated with k = 1, the protocol provides a new uniform consensus protocol forthe synchronous general omission failure model. To our knowledge, this is the rst uniform con-sensus protocol that enjoys strong termination and directs all the processes to terminate by roundmin(f+2; t+1). Let us nally observe that the paper leaves open two problems for future research.The rst consists in proving or disproving that dfk e+ 2 is a tight lower bound for a bad process tostop when f = k x + y with x and y being integers and 0 < y < k (we think it is). The secondproblem concerns t: is t < n=2 a lower bound to solve the strongly terminating early stopping k-setproblem? (Let us remark that the answer is \yes" for k = 1 [23, 30].)4
A k-set protocol can be useful to allocate shared resources. As an example, let us consider theallocation of broadcast frequencies in communication networks (this example is taken from [20]).Such a protocol allows processes to agree on a small number of frequencies for broadcasting largedata (e.g., a movie). As the communication is broadcast-based, the processes can receive the datausing the same frequency.Roadmap The paper consists of 6 sections. Section 2 presents the computation model and givesa denition of the k-set agreement problem. To underline its basic design principles and make itsunderstanding easier, the protocol is presented incrementally. Section 3 presents rst a stronglyterminating k-set agreement protocol. Then, Section 5 enriches this basic protocol to obtain anstrongly terminating, early stopping k-set agreement protocol. Formal statements of the properties(lemmas and theorems) of both protocols are provided in Section 4 and Section 6, respectively. Theproofs of the protocols are also done incrementally.2 Computation Model and Strongly Terminating k-Set Agree-ment2.1 Round-Based Synchronous SystemThe system model consists of a nite set of processes, namely,  = fp1; : : : ; png, that communicateand synchronize by sending and receiving messages through channels. Every pair of processes pi andpj is connected by a channel denoted (pi; pj). The underlying communication system is assumedto be failure-free: there is no creation, alteration, loss or duplication of message.The system is synchronous. This means that each of its executions consists of a sequence ofrounds. Those are identied by the successive integers 1; 2; etc. For the processes, the currentround number appears as a global variable r that they can read, and whose progress is managedby the underlying system. A round is made up of three consecutive phases: A send phase in which each process sends messages. A receive phase in which each process receives messages. The fundamental property of thesynchronous model lies in the fact that a message sent by a process pi to a process pj at roundr, is received by pj at the same round r. A computation phase during which each process processes the messages it received duringthat round and executes local computation.2.2 Process Failure ModelA process is faulty during an execution if its behavior deviates from that prescribed by its algorithm,otherwise it is correct. A failure model denes how a faulty process can deviate from its algorithm[15]. We consider here the following failure models: Crash failure. A faulty process stops its execution prematurely. After it has crashed, a processdoes nothing. Let us observe that if a process crashes in the middle of a sending phase, onlya subset of the messages it was supposed to send might actually be sent. Send Omission failure. A faulty process crashes or omits sending messages it was supposed tosend [14]. 5
 General Omission failure. A faulty process crashes, omits sending messages it was supposedto send or omits receiving messages it was supposed to receive (receive omission) [25].It is easy to see that these failure models are of increasing \severity" in the sense that anyprotocol that solves a problem in the General Omission (resp., Send Omission) failure model, alsosolves it in the (less severe) Send Omission (resp., Crash) failure model [15]. This paper considersthe General Omission failure model. As already indicated, n; t and f denote the total number ofprocesses, the maximum number of processes that can be faulty, and the actual number of processesthat are faulty in a given run, respectively (0  f  t < n=2).As dened in the introduction, a good process is a process that neither crashes nor commitsreceive omission failures. A bad process is a process that commits receive omission failures orcrashes. So, given a run, each process is either good or bad. A good process commits only \benign"failures, while a bad process commits \severe" failures.2.3 Strongly Terminating k-Set AgreementThe problem has been informally stated in the Introduction: every process pi proposes a value viand each correct process has to decide on a value in relation to the set of proposed values. Moreprecisely, the k-set agreement problem is dened by the following three properties: Termination: Every correct process decides. Validity: If a process decides v, then v was proposed by some process. Agreement: No more than k dierent values are decided.As we have seen 1-set agreement is the uniform consensus problem. In the following, we implic-itly assume k  t (this is because, as we have seen in the introduction, k-set agreement is trivialwhen k > t).As already mentioned, we are interested here in protocols that direct all the good processes todecide. So, we consider a stronger version of the k-set agreement problem, in which the terminationproperty is replaced by the following property: Strong Termination: Every good process decides.3 A Strongly Terminating k-Set Agreement ProtocolWe rst present a strongly terminating k-set agreement protocol where the good processes terminatein b tk c + 1 rounds. The protocol is described in Figure 1. r is a global variable that denes thecurrent round number; the processes can only read it.A process pi starts the protocol by invoking the function k-set agreement(vi) where vi is thevalue it proposes. It terminates either by crashing, by returning the default value ? at line 08, orby returning a proposed value at line 11. As we will see, only a bad process can exit at line 08and return ?. That default value cannot be proposed by a process. So, returning ? means \nodecision" from the k-set agreement point of view.3.1 Local VariablesA process pi manages four local variables. The scope of the rst two is the whole execution, whilethe scope of the last two is limited to each round. Their meaning is the following:6
 esti is pi's current estimate of the decision value. It is initial value is vi (line 01). trustedi represents the set of processes that pi currently considers as being correct. It initialvalue is  (the whole set of processes). So, i 2 trustedi (line 04) means that pi considers itis correct. If j 2 trustedi we say \pi trusts pj"; if j =2 trustedi we say \pi suspects pj". rec fromi is a round local variable used to contain the ids of the processes that pi does notcurrently suspect and from which it has received messages during that round (line 05). Wi(j) is a set of processes identities that represents the set of the processes p` that arecurrently trusted by pi and that (to pi's knowledge) trust pj (line 06).3.2 Process BehaviorThe aim is for a process to decide the smallest value it has seen. But, due to the send and receiveomission failures possibly committed by some processes, a process cannot safely decide the smallestvalue it has ever seen, it can only safely decide the smallest in a subset of the values it has receivedduring the rounds. The crucial part of the protocol consists in providing each process with correctrules that allow it to determine its \safe subset".Function k-set agreement(vi)(01) esti  vi; trusted i  ; % r = 0 %(02) for r = 1; : : : ; b tk c+ 1 do(03) begin round(04) if (i 2 trusted i) then foreach j 2  do send(esti; trusted i) to pj enddo endif ;(05) let rec fromi = fj : (estj ; trust j) is received from pj during r ^ j 2 trusted ig;(06) foreach j 2 rec fromi let Wi(j) = f` : ` 2 rec fromi ^ j 2 trust `g;(07) trusted i  rec fromi   j : jWi(j)j < n  t	;(08) if (jtrusted ij < n  t) then return (?) endif ;(09) esti  min(estj received during r and such that j 2 trustedi)(10) end round;(11) return (esti)Figure 1: Strongly terminating k-set protocol for general omission failures, code for pi, t < n2During each round r, these rules are implemented by the following process behavior decomposedin three parts according to the synchronous round-based computation model. If pi considers it is correct (i 2 trustedi), it rst sends to all the processes its current localstate, namely, the current pair (esti; trustedi) (line 04). Otherwise, pi skips the sending phase. Then, pi executes the receive phase (line 05). As already indicated, when it considers themessages it has received during the current round, pi considers only the messages sent by thethe processes it trusts (here, the set trustedi can be seen as a lter). Finally, pi executes the local computation phase that is the core of the protocol (lines 06-09).This phase is made up of the following statements where the value n t constitutes a thresholdthat plays a fundamental role.{ First, pi determines the new value of trustedi (lines 06-07). It is equal to the currentset rec fromi from which are suppressed all the processes pj such that jWi(j)j < n  t.These processes pj are no longer trusted by pi because there are \not enough" processes7
trusted by pi that trust them (pj is missing \Witnesses" to remain trusted by pi, hencethe name Wi(j)); \not enough" means here less than n  t.{ Then, pi checks if it trusts enough processes, i.e., at least n  t (line 08). If the answeris negative, as we will see in the proof, pi knows that it has committed receive omissionfailures and cannot safely decide. It consequently halts, returning the default value ?.{ Finally, if it has not stopped at line 08, pi computes its new estimate of the decisionvalue (line 09) according to the estimate values it has received from the processes itcurrently trusts.4 Proof of the Strongly Terminating ProtocolThe protocol proof assumes t < n=2. It uses the following notations. Given a set of process identities X = fi; j; : : : g, we sometimes use pi 2 X for i 2 X. C is the set of correct processes in a given execution. xi[r] denotes the value of pi's local variable x at the end of round r.By denition trustedi[0] = . When j 2 trustedi, we say that \pi trusts pj" (or \pj is trustedby pi"). Completing [r] = fi : pi proceeds to r+1 g. By denition Completing[0] = . (If r = b tk c+1,\pi proceeds to r + 1" means pi executes line 11.) EST [r] = festi[r] : i 2 Completing [r]g. By denition EST [0] = the proposed values.EST [r] contains the values that are present in the system at the end of round r. Silent[r] = fi : 8j 2 Completing[r] : i =2 trusted j [r]g. It is important to remark that ifi 2 Silent[r], then no process pj (including pi itself) takes into account esti sent by pi (if any)to update its local variables estj at line 09 of the round r. (Silent[0] = ;.)The proof of the following relations are left to the reader:Completing[r + 1]  Completing[r];Silent[r]  Silent[r + 1];8i 2 Completing[r] : Silent[r]    trusted i[r]:4.1 Basic LemmasThe rst lemma that follows will be used to prove that a process that does not commit receiveomission failure decides.Lemma 1 Let pi be a process that is correct or commits only send omission failures. We have 8r :(1) C  trustedi[r] and (2) i 2 Completing[r].Proof The proof is by induction on the round number r. Let pi be a process that is correct orcommits only send omission failures.
8
 Base case. Let us rst observe that we have initially 8j : trustedj[0] = . The setrec fromi[1] computed by pi at line 05 of the rst round includes all the processes that didnot commit send omission failure: it consequently includes (at least) all the correct processes,i.e., at least n  t processes.Let us consider any correct process pj. That process is such that j 2 trust`, for any pl fromwhich pi receives a message, because trust` carries the value trusted`[0] which is equal to .As there are at least n  t correct processes, it follows that the set Wi(j) (computed at line06) contains at least n  t processes. We can then conclude that all the correct processes pjbelong to rec fromi[1] and none of them is suppressed from it when the value trustedi[1] iscomputed at line 07. It follows that jtrustedi[1]j  n   t, from which we conclude that pidoes not stop at line 08. This establishes the base case r = 1: for all the processes pi that donot commit receive omission failures during the rst round we have pi 2 Completing[1] andC  trustedi[1]. Induction step. Let us assume that the lemma is true from the rst round until round r  1.We show it remains true at round r. First of all, let us notice that any correct process pj sendsa message during r. This follows from the induction assumption: as j 2 Completing[r   1]and j 2 trustedj[r   1], pj executes the broadcast at line 04 of the round r.The proof is then the same as the second paragraph of the base step, replacing trusted`[0](equal to ) by trusted`[r   1] that contains (at least) the correct processes (induction as-sumption) and the pair of round numbers (0; 1) by the pair (r   1; r), respectively.2Lemma 1The next two lemmas show that n  t is a critical threshold related to the number of processes(1) for a process to become silent or (2) for the process estimates to become smaller or equal tosome value. More explicitly, the rst of these lemmas states that if a process px is not trusted by\enough" processes (i.e., trusted by less than n   t processes5) at the end of a round r   1, thenthat process px is not trusted by the processes that complete round r.Lemma 2 8r  1 : 8x : fy : y 2 Completing[r 1]^x 2 trusted y[r 1]g < n  t) x 2 Silent[r].Proof Given a round r   1, let px be a process such that fy : y 2 Completing[r   1] ^ x 2trusted y[r   1])g < n   t. Let pi 2 Completing[r]. We have to show that, after pi has executedline 07, x =2 trusted i[r]. x =2 trustedi[r   1] or pi does not receive a message from px during round r. In that case,we have x =2 rec fromi[r]. It follows from the way pi updates its set trustedi (line 07) thatx =2 trustedi[r]. x 2 trustedi[r   1] and pi receives a message from px during round r (i.e. x 2 rec fromi[r]).Let us consider the set Wi(x) computed by pi at line 06 during round r. Let us observe thata process pj that does not trust px at the end of round r   1 sends a pair (estj; trustedj)such that x =2 trustedj. Consequently, due to the lemma assumptions, pi receives at most t(est; trust) messages such that x 2 trust. As t < n=2, we have t < n t, from which it followsthat jfj : j 2 rec fromi ^ x 2 trustjgj < n  t. As Wi(x)  fj : j 2 rec fromi ^ x 2 trustjg(line 06), x is removed from trustedi (line 07) and consequently x =2 trustedi[r].5Equivalently, trusted by at most t processes. 9
2Lemma 2The next lemma shows that if \enough" (i.e., at least n  t) processes have an estimate smallerthan or equal to a value v at the end of a round r   1, then no process pi 2 Completing[r] has avalue greater than v at the end of r.Lemma 3 Let v be an arbitrary value. 8r  1 : fx : estx[r  1]  v ^ x 2 Completing[r  1]g n  t) 8i 2 Completing[r] : esti[r]  v.Proof Let v be a value such that at least n   t processes pj are such that estj[r   1]  v. Letpj be one of these (at least n   t) processes that belongs to Completing[r] and sends a messageduring r. Let us observe that the pair (estj; trustedj) sent during r by pj is such that estj  v.Let pi 2 Completing[r]. Due to the very denition of Completing[r], pi does not stop byreturning ? at line 09, and consequently, jtrustedi[r]j  n   t. This implies that the set of estjvalues received by pi during round r and used to compute its new estimate (at line 09) contains atleast n   t values. Due to the \majority of correct processes" assumption (n   t > t) and, to thefact that two majorities always intersect, at least one of these estj is such that estj  v. The min()function used by pi to update esti at line 09 allows concluding that esti[r]  v. 2Lemma 3Finally, the next lemma states that the sequence of set values EST [0], EST [1],: : : is monotonicand never increases.Lemma 4 8r  0 : EST [r + 1]  EST [r].Proof The lemma follows directly from the fact that, during a round, values can only disappearbecause (1) the new value of esti computed by a process is the smallest of values it has received,and (2) some processes may stop sending or receiving messages. 2Lemma 44.2 Central LemmaThe lemma that follows is central to prove the agreement property, namely, at most k distinct valuesare decided. Its formulation is early-stopping oriented. Being general, this formulation allows usingthe same lemma to prove both the non-early stopping version of the protocol (Theorem 3) and theearly stopping protocol (Theorem 4).Lemma 5 Let r (1  r  b tkc + 1) be a round such that (1) C  Completing[r   1], and (2)jEST [r]j > k (let vm denote the kth smallest value in EST [r], i.e., the greatest value among the ksmallest values of EST [r]). Let i 2 Completing[r]. We have n k r < jtrustedi[r]j ) esti[r]  vm.Proof Let us rst consider the case r = 1. As pi 2 Completing[r] and n   k < jtrustedi[r]j, pimisses at most k   1 values during the rst round. It follows that esti[1]  vm.The rest of the proof addresses the case r  2. To prove the lemma, we prove the contrapositive,namely esti[r] > vm ) jtrustedi[r]j  n  k r. In the following, r and pi denote the round numberand the processes introduced in the lemma statement. Let us consider the following set of processes:P (v; x) = fp` : 9x0  x such that ` 2 Completing[x0] ^ est`[x0]  vgwhere v is a proposed value and x, 0  x  b tkc + 1, a round number. (P (v; x); x > 0 is the setof processes that have processed a value v0  v during some round x0  x; P (v; 0) is the set ofprocesses whose initial value is smaller than or equal to v.)10
Let r  1. We claim k r  jP (vm; r   1)j (Claim C1) and P (vm; r   1)     trustedi[r](Claim C2). The lemma follows directly from these claims, as combining C1 and C2 we obtaink r  jP (vm; r   1)j  j  trustedi[r]j, from which we conclude that jtrustedi[r]j  n  k r.The proofs of C1 and C2 are based on the following properties (implicitly dened in the contextof the lemma assumptions for r  2):Property P1: 8 r0  r   2 : P (vm; r0)  Silent[r0 + 2],Property P2: 8 r0  r   2 : k  jP (vm; r0 + 1)  P (vm; r0)j.We rst prove P1 and P2, and then prove the two claims.Property P1: 8 r0  r   2 : P (vm; r0)  Silent[r0 + 2].Proof of P1. Let r0  r   2. We consider two cases, namely r0 < r   2 and r0 = r   2. r0 < r   2. Let px 2 P (vm; r0). From the denition of the P (vm; r0) set, there is a roundr00  r0 such that estx[r00]  vm. We claim that, at the end of round r00 + 1, at least n   tprocesses do not trust px, which allows us to conclude from Lemma 2 that x 2 Silent[r00 +2].The fact that Silent[r00 + 2]  Silent[r0 + 2] completes the proof.Proof of the Claim. Let pc be a correct process that has not decided by the end of roundr  1. Due to the lemma assumptions, such a correct process does exist. In order to obtain acontradiction, let us suppose that pc trusts px at the end of round r00+1 (i.e., x 2 trustedc[r00+1]). This implies that pc receives and processes a message (estx; ) from px during round r00+1and, due to the min() function used to compute a new estimate, we have estc[r00 + 1]  vm.Let us observe that (O1) all the correct processes have started the round r (by assumption),(O2) a correct process is trusted by every correct process (Lemma 1 and O1) and, (O3) acorrect process py is such that 8d; d0 : d0 < d ) esty[d]  esty[d0] (this is because a correctprocess always receives and processes a message from itself).Let py a correct process. As py trusts pc at round r00 + 2 (Observation O2), pc sends anestimate v  vm during round r00 + 2 and, due to the min() function used to compute a newestimate, we have esty[r00+2]  vm. Moreover, until it decides, py is then such that esty  vm(Observation O3). In particular, at the end of the round r   1, every correct process py issuch that esty[r   1]  vm.Moreover, as there are at least n t correct processes that belong to Completing[r 1] (lemmaassumption), it follows from Lemma 3 that all the processes py that belong to Completing[r]are such that esty[r]  vm. As pi belongs to Completing[r] (lemma assumption) we haveesti[r]  vm: a contradiction (remind that the proof initially assumes that esti[r] > vm).Thus, at the end of round r00 +1, for each correct process pc, x =2 trustedc[r00 +1]. As at leastn  t correct processes belong to Completing[r00 +1], we conclude that n  t processes do nottrust px at the end of round r00 + 1. End of the proof of the Claim. r0 = r   2. Let px 2 P (vm; r0)   P (vm; r0   1) (if px 2 P (vm; r0   1), the previous caseapplies). As i 2 Completing[r] and esti[r] > vm, taking the contrapositive of Lemma 3 weobtain jfy : y 2 Completing[r   1] ^ esty[r   1]  vmgj < n   t. It follows that, even if pxsends estx[r  2]  vm during r  1, strictly less than n  t processes receive and process thatmessage from px during r   1. This implies that jfy : x 2 trustedy[r   1]gj < n   t, fromwhich we conclude by applying Lemma 2, that x 2 Silent[r].End of the proof of the property P1. 11
Property P2: 8 0  r0  r   2 : k  jP (vm; r0 + 1)  P (vm; r0)j.Proof of P2. Let r0 be a round number, 0  r0  r   2 and px 2 P (vm; r0). From property P1, weknow that px 2 Silent[r0 + 2]. Thus, during r0 + 2, any process pj 2 Completing[r0 + 2] (possiblyincluding px itself) ignore the round r0 +1 estimate of px (i.e., estx[r0 +1]) to compute estj[r0 +2].It follows that, if all the processes pj such that estj [r0 + 1]  vm were such that pj 2 P (vm; r0),then no value v  vm would belong to EST [r0 + 2]. This means that the only possibility for suchvalues to belong to EST [r0 + 2], is to be adopted during r0 + 1 by some py =2 P (vm; r0).As EST [r]  EST [r0 + 2] (Lemma 4), and EST [r] contains k values smaller than or equal tovm (lemma assumption), we can conclude that EST [r0 + 2] contains at least k values smallerthan or equal to vm. It follows that, during round r0 + 1, at least k processes pj such thatpj 2 Completing[r0 + 1] ^ pj =2 P (vm; r0) adopt an estimate smaller than or equal to vm. Thisimplies that jP (vm; r0 + 1)  P (vm; r0)j  k. End of the proof of the property P2.Claim C1: k r  jP (vm; r   1)j.Proof of C1. The proof is by induction on the round number r0. Base case r0 = 1: By assumption, there are k distinct values smaller than or equal to vm inEST [r]. As no new value appears in a round, at least k distinct values smaller than or equalto vm were initially proposed, it follows that k  jP (vm; 0)j. Induction case: k r0  jP (vm; r0   1)j is satised for 1  r0 < r.As k  jP (vm; r0)  P (vm; r0   1)j (Property P2) and as P (vm; r0   1)  P (vm; r0) (from thedenition of the P (v; x) sets), we have k + jP (vm; r0   1)j  jP (vm; r0)j (A).Combining k(r 1)  jP (vm; r 2)j (induction assumption) with A, we obtain k r  jP (vm; r 1)j.End of the proof of the claim C1.Claim C2: P (vm; r   1)    trustedi[r].Proof of C2. The claim is trivially satised if trustedi[r] = ;. In the other case, let us observe that,as pi 2 Completing[r], we have Silent[r]   trustedi[r] (see the \Notation" section). Combiningthis inclusion with P (vm; r 2)  Silent[r] (Property P1), we obtain P (vm; r 2)   senderi[r](B).Due to the property P2, the set P (vm; r   1)   P (vm; r   2) has at least k elements. Hence,it is not empty. Let px 2 P (vm; r   1)   P (vm; r   2). We consider two cases. If px does notsend a message to pi or pi fails to receive the message of px during r, we have x =2 rec fromi[r]which implies x 2    trustedi[r] (line 07). If px sends a message to pi in round r, it sendsv = estx[r   1]  vm. Due to the min() function used to compute new estimate (line 09) and as piis such that esti[r] > vm, pi does not process v during r. It follows that x 2    trustedi[r]. So,for each process px such that px 2 P (vm; r  1)  P (vm; r  2), we always have x 2   trustedi[r](C). Combining B and C, we obtain P (vm; r  1)    trustedi[r] which proves the claim. End ofthe proof of the claim C2. 2Lemma 54.3 Properties of the ProtocolTheorem 1 [Validity] A decided value is a proposed value.12
Proof Let us rst observe that a process pi decides at line 11 of the last round. It then decidesesti[b tk c+ 1].The proof is an easy induction on the round number. Initially (r = 0), each esti local variablecontains a proposed value (line 01). Let us assume this is true until round r   1. We show it istrue at the end of round r. Let us notice that, due to the test of line 08, pi updates esti at line 09only if jtrustedij  n  t (otherwise, pi stops at line 08 without deciding). Due to line 07, trustediis a set including only processes pj whose value estj has been received during the current round r.As that value is the value computed by pj during the previous round, it follows from the inductionassumption that esti contains a proposed value. 2Theorem 1Theorem 2 [Strong Termination] A process pi that neither crashes nor commits receive omissionfailures decides.Proof Let pi be a good process (so, either pi is correct, or commits only send omission failures).Lemma 1 shows that 8r : C  trustedi[r]. We conclude from that lemma that 8r : jtrustedi[r]j jCj  n  t. It follows that pi never exits at line 08. Consequently, pi decides at line 11 of the lastround r = b tkc+ 1. 2Theorem 2As a correct process does not commit receive omission failures, the following corollary is animmediate consequence of the previous theorem.Corollary 1 [Termination] Every correct process decides.Theorem 3 [Agreement] No more than k dierent values are decided.Proof Let us consider the set EST [b tk c+1] that contains the estimate values present in the systemat the end of the round b tk c+1. We claim jEST [b tk c+1]j  k (claim C). Due to very denition ofthe EST [r] sets, a process that decides decides a value 2 EST [b tk c+ 1]. This implies that at mostk dierent values are decided.Proof of C. Let t = kx+y with y < k (hence b tk c = x). The proof is by contradiction. Let us assumethat jEST [x+1]j > k. Let vm be the kth smallest values in EST [x+1] and let i 2 Completing[x+1]such that esti[x+ 1] > vm.As each correct process decides (Corollary 1), there are at least n   t (correct) processes inCompleting[x + 1]. Moreover, as jEST [x + 1]j > k, the assumptions of Lemma 5 are satised.Considering our assumption esti[x + 1] > vm, and applying the contrapositive of Lemma 5 toprocess pi, we obtain jtrustedi[x + 1]j  n   k(x + 1) = n   (kx + k) < n   (kx + y) = n   t.This implies that pi returns ? at line 08 during the round x+1: a contradiction with the fact thati 2 Completing[x+ 1]. End of the proof of the claim C. 2Theorem 35 A Strongly Terminating and Early Stopping k-Set AgreementProtocolThis section enriches the previous strongly terminating k-set agreement protocol to obtain anearly stopping protocol, namely, a protocol where a good process decides and halts by roundmin(bfk c+ 2; b tk c+ 1), and a bad process executes at most min(dfk e+ 2; b tk c+ 1) rounds.13
The protocol is described in Figure 2. To make reading and understanding easier, all the linesfrom the rst protocol appears with the same number. The line number of each of the 10 new linesthat make the protocol early stopping are prexed by \E". We explain here only the new parts ofthe protocol.Function k-set agreement(vi)(01) esti  vi; trusted i  ; can deci  ;; % r = 0 %(02) for r = 1; : : : ; b tk c+ 1 do(03) begin round(04) if (i 2 trusted i) then foreach j 2  do send(esti; trusted i; can deci) to pj enddo endif ;(E01) let REC FROMi = fig [ fj : (estj; trust j ; c decj) is received from pj during rg;(E02) let CAN DECi = [(c decj : j 2 REC FROMi );(E03) if (i =2 trustedi _ i 2 can deci) then(E04) if jCAN DECi j > t then let ESTi = festj : j 2 REC FROMi ^ c decj 6= ;g;(E05) return (min(ESTi))(E06) endif endif ;(05) let rec fromi = fj : (estj ; trust j ; c decj) is received from pj during r ^ j 2 trusted ig;(06) foreach j 2 rec fromi let Wi(j) = f` : ` 2 rec fromi ^ j 2 trust `g;(07) trusted i  rec fromi   j : jWi(j)j < n  t	;(08) if (jtrusted ij < n  t) then return (?) endif ;(09) esti  min(estj received during r and such that j 2 trustedi);(E07) can deci  [(c decj received during r and such that j 2 trustedi);(E08) if (i 2 trustedi ^ i =2 can deci)(E09) then if (n  k r < jtrustedij) _ (can deci 6= ;) then can deci  can deci [ fig endif(E10) endif(10) end round;(11) return (esti)Figure 2: k-set early-deciding protocol for general omission failures, code for pi, t < n25.1 Additional Local VariablesA process pi manages three additional local variables, one (can deci ) whose scope is the wholecomputation, and two (CAN DECi and REC FROMi) whose scope is limited to each round.Their meaning is the following. can deci is a set of process identities that contains, to pi's knowledge, all the processes thatcan decide a value without violating the agreement property. The current value of can deciis part of each message sent by pi. Its initial value is ;. REC FROMi is used by pi to store its id plus the ids of all the processes from which it hasreceived messages during the current round r (line E01). Dierently from the way rec fromiis computed (line 05), no ltering (with the set trustedi) is used to compute REC FROMi . CAN DECi is used to store the union of all the can decj sets that pi has received during thecurrent round r (line E02).5.2 Process BehaviorAs already indicated, the behavior of a process pi is modied by adding only 10 lines (E01-E10).It is important to notice that no variable used in the basic protocol is updated by these lines; thebasic protocol variables are only read. This means that, when there is no early deciding/stoppingat line E05, the enriched protocol behaves exactly as the basic protocol.14
Let us now examine the two parts of the protocol where the new statements appear. Let us rst consider the lines E07-E10.After it has updated its current estimate esti (line 09), pi updates similarly its set can deci ,to learn the processes that can early decide. As we can see, esti and can deci constitute apair that is sent (line 04) and updated \atomically".Then, if pi trusts itself (i 2 trustedi) and, up to now, was not allowed to early decide andstop (i =2 can deci), it tests a predicate to know if it can early decide. If it can, pi adds itsidentity to can deci (line E09). The \early decision" predicate is made up of two parts:{ If can deci 6= ;, then pi learns that other processes can early decide. Consequently, as ithas received and processed their estimates values (line 09), it can safely adds its identityto can deci .{ If n k r < jtrustedij, then pi discovers that the set of processes it trusts is \big enough"for it to conclude that it knows one of the k smallest estimate values currently presentin the system. \Big enough" means here greater than n  k r. (Let us notice that thatthreshold was used in Lemma 5 in the proof of the basic protocol.) Let us now consider the lines E01-E06.As already indicated REC FROMi and CAN DECi are updated in the receive phase of thecurrent round.To use these values to decide during the current round (at line E05), pi must either be faulty(predicate i =2 trustedi) or have previously sent its pair (esti; can deci) to the other processes(predicate i =2 trustedi _ i 2 can deci evaluated at line E03). But, when i 2 trustedi,i 2 can deci is not a suciently strong predicate for pi to safely decide. This is because it ispossible that pi committed omission faults just during the current round. So, to allow pi toearly decide, we need to be sure that at least one correct process can decide (as it is correctsuch a process pj can play a \pivot" role sending its (estj ; can decj) pair to all the processes).Hence, the intuition for the nal early decision/stopping predicate, namely jCAN DECi j > tused at line E04: that additional predicate guarantees that at least one correct process canearly decide and consequently has transmitted or will transmit its (estj ; can decj) pair to all.So, the early decision/stopping predicate for a process pi spans actually two rounds r and r0(r0 > r). This is a \two phase" predicate split as follows: During r (lines E08|E09): (i 2 trustedi^ i =2 can deci)^ (n k r < jtrustedij)_ (can deci 6=;), and During r0 (lines E03|E04): (i =2 trustedi _ i 2 can deci) ^ jCAN DECi j > t.Moreover, for a correct process pi, the assignment can deci  can deci [fig can be interpretedas a synchronization point separating the time instants when they are evaluated to true.6 Proof of the Strongly Terminating Early Stopping Protocol6.1 Basic LemmasThe next lemma extends Lemma 1 to the early stopping context.15
Lemma 6 Let rd be the rst round during which a correct process decides at line E05 (If there isno such round, let rd = b tkc+1). Let pi be a process that is correct or commits only send omissionfailures. 8r  rd: if pi does not decide at line E05 of the round r, we have (1) C  trustedi[r] and(2) i 2 Completing[r].Proof The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Lemma 1. It is left to the reader.2Lemma 6Lemma 5 considers a round r such that C  Completing[r   1] (i.e., a round executed by allthe correct processes). Its proof relies on Lemma 1, but considers only the rounds r0  r. As,until a correct process decides, the Lemma 1 and the Lemma 6 are equivalent, it follows that theLemma 1 can be replaced by Lemma 6 in the proof of Lemma 5. Let us also observe that theproofs of the Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 are still valid in the early stopping context (these proofs use theset Completing[r] and do not rely on the set C). We now state and prove additional lemmas usedto prove the early stopping k-set agreement protocol.Lemma 7 The set ESTi[r] computed by pi during round r (line E04) is not empty.Proof Let pi be a process and r be a round number such that pi computes ESTi during round r. Letus rst observe that, due to the test of line E04, CAN DECi 6= ;. As, from the protocol text (lineE02), CAN DECi = Sj2REC FROMi c decj , it necessarily exists x such that x 2 REC FROMi ^c decx 6= ;. Moreover, due to the denition of REC FROMi[r], x = i or x 6= i. In the rst case,estx = esti[r   1] is associated with c decx. In the second case, the estimate estx[r   1] sent bypx and received by pi during r is associated with c decx. In both case, this estimate belongs toESTi[r] (from the very denition of ESTi[r] at line E04). 2Lemma 7Lemma 8 Assuming that a process decides at line E05 during round r, let px be a process thatproceeds to round r + 1 (if r = b tk c + 1, \proceed to round r + 1" means \execute the return()statement at line 11"). We have: x =2 trustedx[r] _ x 2 can decx[r].Let us remark that it follows from that lemma that (i) if px executes line E03 during roundr+1, it then evaluates the predicate in the if statement to true. Moreover, (ii) if px sends messagesduring round r+1 (which implies that x 2 trustedx[r], line 04), these messages necessarily carry acan decx set that contains x. Proof Let us dene I[r] = fy : 9r0y < r such that y 2 can decy[r0y]g,where r is the round number dened in the lemma statement. Let px a process that proceeds tor + 1.Let pi be a process that decides during round r. As pi decides at line E05, we have jCAN DECi[r]j >t. As any process pj is the only that can start adding j in a can dec set (line E09), it follows fromthe way the CAN DEC sets are computed (lines E01-E02) that at least t + 1 processes py haveexecuted can decy  can decy [ fyg by the end of round r   1, i.e., jI[r]j > t (E). Moreover, sincepx proceeds to round r + 1, jtrustedx[r]j  n   t (F)(otherwise, px would return ? at line 08).By combining E and F, we obtain that 9y 2 I[r] \ trustedx[r]. This means that px receives andprocesses a message from a process py; y 2 I[r] during round r.The fact that py sends messages during r implies that py trusts itself at least until the endof round r   1 (line 04). Consequently, py takes into account the can dec sets it has previouslycomputed to update can decy during round r   1 (line E07). In particular, as y 2 I[r], y 2can decy[ry]  can decy[r   1]. Since can decy[r   1] is sent by py during r, it follows that pxprocesses a non empty can dec set at line E07. Consequently, if x 2 trustedx[r] then, after the16
lines E08-E10 have been executed by px, we necessarily have x 2 can decx[r] and the lemma follows.2Lemma 8Lemma 9 Let i 2 Completing[r] (1  r  b tk c + 1). can deci[r] 6= ; ) esti[r] is one of the ksmallest values in EST [r].Proof can deci[r] 6= ; means that n k r < jtrustedi[r]j (line E09), or pi has received and processeda message carrying a non-empty can decx set (line E07). We consider each case separately. Case 1: n  k r < jtrustedi[r]j and each pair (estx; can decx) received and processed (at lines09 and E07) by pi during round r is such that can decx = ;. We claim that, in that case, allthe correct processes start round r (Claim C).If EST [r]  k, the lemma is trivially correct, so we suppose that EST [r] > k. Thanks toClaim C, we can conclude that C  Completing[r   1]. We can consequently apply Lemma5 and the lemma follows.Proof of the Claim C. We rst establish that (assertion A) 8r0 < r : i 2 trustedi[r0] ^can deci[r0] = ;. Let us rst observe that, as pi executes can deci  can deci [ fig duringround r (case assumption), i 2 trustedi[r] (lines E08-E09). It follows then from the man-agement of the trustedi set (lines 05-07) that (1) 8r0 < r : i 2 trustedi[r0]. Moreover, asi 2 trustedi[r],pi receives and processes during r the can dec set it has computed duringr   1. Due to the case assumption (i.e., each pair (estx; can decx) received and processed bypi during round r is such that can decx = ;), can deci[r   1] = ;. The same reasoning canbe applied at round r   1; : : : ; 1, from which we conclude that (2) 8r0 < r : can deci[r0] = ;.The assertion follows by combining (1) and (2).We have to show that C  Completing[r 1]. In order to obtain a contradiction, let us supposethat it exists a correct process that stops before the end of round r   1. Let r0 ( r   1)be the rst round during which a correct process stops and let pj be a correct process thatstops during r0. This means that either pi returns ? at line 08 or pi decides at line E05.As no correct process decides before r0 (by the denition of the round r0), it follows fromLemma 6 that jtrustedj [r0]j  n   t, from which we conclude that pj cannot returns ?(line 08). Consequently, the only possibility for pj to stop during r0 is to decide at lineE05. But, in that case, as pi proceeds to round r0 + 1( r) and, due to Lemma 8, we havei =2 trustedi[r0] _ i 2 can deci[r0]. Since r0 < r, this contradicts the assertion A. End of theproof of the Claim C. Case 2: pi receives and processes a pair (estx; can decx) carrying a non-empty can decx setduring round r. So, there is a chain of processes j = ja; ja 1; : : : ; j0 = i that has carried anon-empty can dec set to pi. This chain is such that a > 0, n  k(r   a) < jtrustedj [r   a]jis satised, and during round r   x; 0  x  a   1, process jx receives and processes thepair (vx+1; can decx+1 6= ;) sent by process jx+1. As each process in the chain computes theminimum of the values it has received and processed, vx+1  vx and v1  esti[r], where v1 isthe value received by process j0 = i from process j1 during r. Hence, va  v1 where va is thevalue sent by process ja at round r   a+ 1. Moreover, at process j = ja, when the predicaten  k(r   a) < jtrustedj[r   a]j is satised at round r   a, Case 1 applies. Thus, va is one ofthe k smallest value of EST [r   a]. Due to Lemma 4, EST [r]  EST [r   a]. Consequently,va  esti[r] implies that esti[r] is one of the k smallest values of EST [r], which proves thelemma for Case 2. 17
2Lemma 9Lemma 10 Assuming that a process decides at line E05 during round r, let px be a process thatproceeds to round r + 1 (if r = b tk c + 1, \proceed to round r + 1" means \execute the return()statement at line 11"). We have: estx[r] is among the k smallest values in EST [r   1].Proof Let px be a process that proceeds to round r + 1. Let us observe that the assumptionsstated in this lemma and Lemma 8 are the same. Consequently, by using the proof of Lemma 8,we have px receives and processes during the round r a pair (esty; can decy 6= ;) from a process py(this is established in the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 8).Let us now consider the value esty[r   1] sent by py to px during r. As y 2 Completing[r   1]and can decy[r   1] 6= ;, it follows from Lemma 9 that esty[r   1] is among the k smallest valuesof EST [r   1]. As esty[r   1] is taken into account by px to compute estx[r] at line 09, we haveestx[r]  esty[r   1]. Finally, EST [r]  EST [r   1] (Lemma 4) allows concluding that estx[r] isamong the k smallest values in EST [r   1], and the lemma follows. 2Lemma 10Lemma 11 Let r  b tkc be the rst round during which a process decides at line E05. Then,(1) every process that is correct or commits only send omission failures decides at line E05 duringround r or r + 1. Moreover, (2) no process executes more than r + 1 rounds.Proof We assume that a process decides before the end of round b tk c. Let r be the rst round duringwhich a process decides. Let DC[r0] denotes the set of correct processes that decide at line E05during round r0. Let us notice that, due to the assumption on round number r, 8r0 < r : DC[r0] = ;.We rst state a claim that follow from the protocol text and the fact a process early decides at r.Claim C : If a correct process pc decides during r then, pc sends messages during r that carry acan decc set such that c 2 can decc.Proof of the Claim C : As C  Completing[r   1] (i.e., no correct process decide before the end ofround r   1), we can apply Lemma 1 from which we obtain c 2 trustedc[r   1]. Hence, pc sendsmessages (that carry can decc[r 1]) at the beginning of r. Moreover, as pc decides at line E05 and,due to the test of line E03, we necessarily have c 2 can decc[r 1]. End of the Proof of the Claim C.We now prove the lemma by considering two cases: First case: every correct process decides during round r.Let pi be a process that commits only send omission failures and does not decide duringround r. As C  Completing[r   1], it follows from Lemma 6 that C  trustedi[r]. Thisimplies that pi cannot returns ? at line 08 and then, proceeds to round r + 1. We now showthat can deci[r]j > t. C  trustedi[r] means that pi receives and processes a message fromevery correct process during r. Consequently, as every correct pc sends messages that carrya can dec set that contains c during round r (Claim C), C  can deci[r] (line E07). Hence,jcan deci[r]j > t. Let us now consider pi during round r+1. Let us rst notice that, as pi addsits identity in the REC FROMi[r + 1] set (line E01), C  can deci[r]  CAN DECi[r + 1](line E02), which implies that jCAN DECi[r + 1]j > t. Moreover, pi evaluates at r + 1 thepredicate of line E03 to true (Lemma 8). As jCAN DECi[r + 1]j > t, pi decides a value atline E05. This proves the rst item of the lemma in the case assumption.Let now pi be a process that commits receive omission failure and does not decide duringround r. Suppose that pi does not decide at line E05 during round r+1. Let us remark that,18
as every correct process decides during round r, at most t processes send messages duringround r + 1. It follows that the set rec fromi[r + 1] computed by pi at line 05 contains atmost t process ids, from which we conclude that 8j 2 rec fromi : jWi(j)j  t < n   t (line06). Therefore, trustedi[r+1] = ; and pi returns ? at line 08: the second item of the lemmafollows. Second case: at least one correct process has not decided at the end of round r.Let pi be a process that is correct or commits only send omission failures. Let us rst observethat pi proceeds to round r+1. As r is the rst round during which a correct process decides,it follows from Lemma 6 that C  trustedi[r], from which we conclude that pi cannot returns? at line 08 during round r.We rst show that DC[r]  can deci[r]. Let us consider a correct process pc that decidesduring round r (i.e., c 2 DC[r]). Due to the claim C, pc send a messages during r. Moreover,as C  trustedi[r], pi receives and processes the message sent by pc during r. Since thismessage carries a can dec set such that c 2 can dec (claim C) , pi adds c in its can deciset at line E07. This is true for any correct process pc that decides during round r, henceDC[r]  can deci[r].We now show that pi decides at line E05 during round r + 1. As pi does not commit sendomission failures, pi receives a message during r + 1 from every correct process pc that hasnot decided during r. Such a message carry a can decc set such that fcg [DC[r]  can decc(the fact that c 2 can decc follows from Lemma 8, as for a correct process pc we havec 2 trustedc[r]). Consequently, it follows from lines E01-E02 that C  CAN DECi[r + 1].Moreover, as pi evaluates the local predicate at line E03 to true (Lemma 8), pi decides at lineE05.This proves the item (1) of the lemma. As far as item (2) is concerned, let us now consider a faultyprocess pi that commits receive omission failure while not crashing. Suppose that pi does not earlydecide (at line E05) during rounds r and r + 1. We show that pi has returned ? by the end ofround r + 1.In order to establish a contradiction, suppose that pi proceeds to round r + 2. As pi doesnot return ? at line 08, jtrustedi[r + 1]j  n   t. As trustedi[r + 1]  rec fromi[r + 1] REC FROMi[r+1], we have n  t  jREC FROMi[r+1]j. This means that pi receives messagesfrom at least n   t processes during round r + 1. Yet, every message sent during r + 1 carries acan dec set that contains the id of its sender (Lemma 8). Consequently, REC FROMi[r + 1] CAN DECi[r+1] and then, jCAN DECi[r+1]j > t. Finally, as pi evaluates the predicate of lineE03 to true (Lemma 8), pi decides at line E05: a contradiction. 2Lemma 116.2 Properties of the ProtocolTheorem 4 [Agreement] No more than k dierent values are decided.Proof To prove the lemma, we consider two cases according to the rst round r during which aprocess decides. Case 1: r  b tk c.In that case, any process that decides decides at line E05 during round r or r + 1 (Lemma11). We show that any decided value is among the k smallest values in EST [r   1].19
Let us rst observe that if a process pi decides at line E05 during a round r0, there is a processpx such that 9x 2 REC FROMi[r0] and can decx[r0   1] 6= ; (possibly x = i) (G). Thisfollows from the fact that jCAN DECi[r0]j > t and the way CAN DEC sets are computed.Moreover, the value estx[r   1] belongs to ESTi[r] (by the denition of the ESTi[r] set).{ Let pi be a process that decides during r.Let px be a process that satises the assertion G. As px sends messages during r or is piitself (this is because x 2 REC FROMi[r]), x 2 Completing[r  1]. Since can decx[r 1] 6= ;, it follows from Lemma 9 that estx[r   1] is among the k smallest values inEST [r  1] (i). Moreover, estx[r  1] 2 ESTi[r] (ii) and, ESTi[r]  EST [r  1] (i.e., theset ESTi[r] contains only values computed during r 1) (iii). Due to the min() functionused by pi to compute the value v that it decides, combining (i), (ii) and (iii) allowsconcluding that v is among the k smallest values in EST [r   1].{ Let us now consider a process pi (if any) that decides during round r + 1.As before, let us consider a process px as dened in assertion G, so we have estx[r] 2ESTi[r+1]. Since a process has early decided at r and px proceeds to round r+1 (thisis because x = i or, as x 2 REC FROMi[r + 1], px necessarily sends a message duringround r+1), assumptions of Lemma 10 are satised. Consequently, estx[r] is among thek smallest values in EST [r   1]. As ESTi[r + 1]  EST [r] and EST [r]  EST [r   1](Lemma 4), we have ESTi[r + 1]  EST [r   1]. Moreover, as estx[r] 2 ESTi[r + 1], wecan conclude that the value decided by pi is among the k smallest ones in EST [r   1]. Case 2: r = b tk c+ 1. We consider two cases according to lines at which processes decides.{ At least one process decides at line E05. We show that, in that case, any decided value isamong the k smallest values in EST [r 1](= EST [b tk c]). Let pi be a process that decidesat line E05 during round r. The reasoning used in the rst item of Case 1 is still valid.Consequently, pi decides one of the k smallest in EST [r   1]. Let now pj be a processthat decides at line 11. As a process decides at line E05 of round r(= b tk c + 1) and pj\proceeds to round r+1" (which means here that pj executes the return() statement atline 11), the assumptions of Lemma 10 are satised, from which we conclude that estj[r]is among the k smallest values in EST [r 1]. To conclude, let us observe that pj decidesthe value estj[r].{ No process decides at line E05. This means that the early decision machinery (i.e., linesE01-E06 and E08-E10) is useless in the considered execution. Let us observe that, if wesuppress lines E01-E06 and E08-E10 in the protocol of Figure 2, the resulting protocolis exactly the protocol of Figure 1. Dierently said, while no process decides, for allprocess pi, the management of variable trusti and esti does not dier in the protocols ofFigures 1 and 2. This implies that, in the particular execution considered here, we cansafely apply Theorem 3 which states that no more than k distinct values are decided.2Theorem 4Theorem 5 [Strong Termination and Early Stopping] (i) A process that is correct or commits onlysend omission failures decides and halts by round min(bfk c+2; b tk c+1). (ii) No process halts aftermin(dfk e+ 2; b tk c+ 1) rounds. 20
Proof The fact that no process executes more than bt=kc+1 rounds is an immediate consequenceof the code of the protocol executed in a round-based synchronous model. Moreover, let us observethat the theorem follows directly from Lemma 11 as soon as a process decides at round r such thatr  bf=kc + 1. So, to prove the theorem we consider the case where no process decides during around  bf=kc+ 1. Let f = xk + y  t, where 0  y < k. (This means that x = bf=kc.)Proof of item (i).Assuming that no no process has decided by round x+1, we have to show that that a process thatis correct or commits only send omission failures decides and halts by round bfk c + 2. To show it,let us consider the consecutive rounds x+ 1 and x+ 2. Round x+ 1.Let pi be a process that is correct or commits only send omission failures. We rst establishthat pi proceeds to round x+2. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 6: as, by assumption,no correct process decides by the end of round x + 1, C  trustedi[x + 1] (A). Then, as pidoes not decides nor crashes during x+ 1, pi proceeds to round x+ 2.We now show that for every process pi that is correct or commits only send omission failures:i 2 trustedi[x+ 1] ) i 2 can deci[x + 1] (B). Let us assume that i 2 trustedi[x+ 1] and letus consider pi when it executes lines E07-E10. If i 2 can deci[x] then, as i 2 trustedi[x+ 1],we still have i 2 can deci[x + 1] (line E07). If i =2 can deci[x], as i 2 trustedi[x + 1], pievaluates the local predicate of line E09. Moreover, as C  trustedi[x+ 1] (assertion A), wehave jtrustedi[x+ 1]j  n  f = n  (kx+ y) > n  k(x+ 1). Consequently, the predicate isevaluated by pi to true, from which we conclude (line E09) that i 2 can deci[x+ 1]. Round x+ 2.Let us rst observe that, due to assertion A, every correct process pc is such that c 2trustedc[x + 1]. This implies that pc sends messages during x + 2 (line 04). Moreover,due to the assertion B, these messages carry a can decc set such that c 2 can decc (C). Letpi be a process that is correct or commits only send omission failures. We have to show thatpi decides. As pi does not commit receive omission failures, it receives from every correct pca can decc set such that c 2 can decc. Consequently, we have C  CAN DECi[x+ 2] (linesE01-E02) from which we obtain that CAN DECi[x + 2] > t. As pi evaluates the predicateof line E03 to true (assertion B), pi decides at line E05. This completes the proof of the rstitem of the theorem.Proof of item (ii).To prove the second item of the theorem (namely no process halts after the round dfk e + 2), weconsider two cases. Let us rst consider the case where f = xk + y and y 6= 0. We have thendfk e+ 2 = x+3. As all the correct processes decide by the end of round x+ 2, the item follows byLemma 11. The rest of the proof addresses the second case, i.e., y = 0.Let us rst observe that assertions A, B and C stated above do not depend on the value of y.We partition the set of correct processes according to the fact they have or not their id in theircan dec set at the end of round x. Let IC[r] denote the subset of correct processes pc such thatc 2 can decc[r] and IC[r], the complementary of IC[r] in C (i.e., IC[r] = C   IC[r]). We claim:jIC[x]j  t (Claim C1) and, 8i 2 IC[r] : trustedi[x] = C (Claim C2).Proof of the Claim C1. Claim C1 is obtained by contradiction. Suppose that jIC[x]j > t. Letpi 2 IC[x]. As no correct process decides by the end of round x+1, it follows from Lemma 6 that pireceives during round x+1 a can decc such that c 2 can decc from every process pc that belongs to21
IC[x]. Consequently, IC[x]  CAN DECi[x+1] (line E01-E02) and then, t < jCAN DECi[x+1]j.Moreover, as pi 2 IC[x] (i.e., i 2 can deci[x]) and pi is correct (i.e., i 2 trustedi[x]) pi evaluatesthe predicate of line E03 to true, from which we obtain that pi decides at line E05 during x+ 1: acontradiction. End of the Proof of the Claim C1.Proof of the Claim C2. Let us consider a process pi 2 IC[x]. Due to Claim C1), such a processexists. As pi does not add its id in can deci[x] and i 2 trustedi[x] (because pi is a correct process), pievaluates during round x the predicate of line E09 to false. Therefore, n kx = n f  jtrustedi[x]j.As jCj = n   f , it follows from the fact that C  trustedi[x] (assertion A) that C = trustedi[x].End of the Proof of the Claim C2.We now establish that (when y = 0) 8i 2 Completing[x + 1] : i 2 trustedi[x + 1] ) i 2can deci[x + 1] (B'). This property is true for a process pi that is correct or commits only sendomission failure (assertion B). Let us consider a process pj that commits receive omission failures.Let us assume that j 2 trustj[x+1]. Due to lines 06-07, it follows that pj receives at least n  t setstrust[x] such that j 2 trust[x]. This implies that pj receives and processes at least one trustc[x]set such that j 2 trustc[x] from a correct process pc. As pj is not correct, we necessarily haveC ( trustedc[x]. Due to Claim C2, this process pc necessarily belongs to IC[r]. Hence, pj alsoreceives from pc can decc[x] 6= ; (by denition of IC[r]). Consequently, as j 2 trustedj[x + 1], itfollows from lines E08-E10 that we necessarily have j 2 can decj [x+ 1].We now show that a process pj that commits receive omission failure decides or halts by theend of round x + 2. In order to establish a contradiction, suppose that pj proceeds to roundx+ 3(= dfk e+ 3). In particular, pj does not return ? at line 08 during round x+ 2, which meansthat jtrustedj[x + 2]j  n   t. As trustedj[x + 2]  REC FROMj [x + 2], this implies that pjreceives at least n  t messages during round x+2. Moreover, let us observe that, due to assertionB' and the test of line 04, every message sent during x+2 carries a can deci such that i 2 can deci(where pi is the sender). It follows that jCAN DECj[x + 2]j  n   t > t (line E01-E02). As pjuses trustedj[x+ 1] and can decj [x+ 1] when it executes line E03, due to assertion B', the test issatised. It follows that pj decides at line E05 during round x+ 2: a contradiction. 2Theorem 5The next corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous theorem.Corollary 2 [Termination] Every correct process decides.Theorem 6 [Validity] A decided value is a proposed value.Proof For the processes that decide at line 11, the proof of Theorem 1 applies. So, let usconsider a process pi that decides at line E05. The validity property follows from the fact thatESTi[r]  EST [r   1] (the values received by pi during a round r have been determined duringthe round r   1), and ESTi[r] 6= ; (Lemma 7). 2Theorem 6Theorem 7 [Bit Complexity] Let b be the number of bits required to represent a proposed value.The bit complexity is upper bounded by O(n(b+ 2n)f=k) per process.Proof The theorem follows directly from the following observations: (1) at most dfk e rounds areexecuted, (2) encoding a set with a bit array, the size of a message sent by a process is b+2n, and(3) a process that sends a message sends it to all the processes. 2Theorem 7
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